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Abstract
It is known that learning of players who interact in a repeated game can be interpreted
as an evolutionary process in a population of ideas. These analogies have so far mostly
been established in deterministic models, and memory loss in learning has been seen to
act similarly to mutation in evolution. We here propose a representation of reinforcement
learning as a stochastic process in finite ‘populations of ideas’. The resulting birth-death
dynamics has absorbing states and allows for the extinction or fixation of ideas, marking
a key difference to mutation-selection processes in finite populations. We characterize the
outcome of evolution in populations of ideas for several classes of symmetric and asymmetric
games.
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21 Introduction
The study of games in non-cooperative game theory has traditionally focused on the analysis of
their equilibrium points, in particular the celebrated Nash equilibria [1, 2]. These are the points
in strategy space that fully rational players choose, based on full information of the game and
assuming that their opponents act fully rationally as well. At a Nash point no player can increase
their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy. These ideas provide a natural first approach
to the analysis of games, and they are mathematically convenient as they do not involve any
actual dynamics. On the other hand the scope of such equilibrium concepts is naturally limited.
The question of how players would find optimal points in strategy space is not asked, let alone
answered. Experiments in behavioural economics show that real-world players do not behave
fully rationally in repeated games, and suggest that inductive learning from past experience may
be a better model than the assumption of full rationality [3, 4].
In many models of dynamic learning, players do not find the mutually optimal strategy imme-
diately; in fact they potentially never do. Instead they initially try out the different actions
available to them, and attempt to learn from past experience. Players assess the success or
otherwise of individual strategies and then choose those that worked well in the past. Their
opponents adapt as well, and strategies that may have performed well previously can become
less successful when the opponents’ propensities have changed. This generates a coupled dy-
namics between the players, and it is not clear a-priori if and when such dynamics converge to
Nash points. Indeed, work on games of low and high complexity has suggested that learning
may result in chaotic motion [5, 6, 7, 8], in some cases with very high dimensional attractors.
Situations in which systems of this type settle down to unique well-defined fixed points then
seem to be the exception rather than the rule.
Learning and adaptation based on past experience can be interpreted as an evolutionary process
of ‘ideas’ in the minds of the players. Bo¨rgers and Sarin, for example, write [9] ‘Decision makers
are usually not completely committed to just one set of ideas [...]. Rather [...] several possible
ways of behaving are present in their minds simultaneously. Which of these predominate, and
which are given less attention, depends on the experiences of the individual. The change which
the “population of ideas” in the decision maker’s mind undergoes may be analogous to biological
evolution.’ Similar approaches have also been used in models of language evolution; see e.g.
Blythe et al [10]. In the context of a game the evolutionary process in a population of ideas
broadly works as follows: each player carries in his or her mind a mixed populations of ideas.
These represent the different actions (pure strategies) he or she can take in the game. Different
ideas will be present in the player’s mind in different proportions. At each instance of the game
each player pulls out one idea (action) out of their mind at random, and uses it in the game.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the evolutionary process that occurs in a population of ideas: two ideas in the mind
of player A are selected (
⊙
and ©) as indicated by the rectangle on the right. Both ideas play against the
same randomly chosen adversary idea (here ) in the population of ideas of player B and the relevant payoffs
are recorded, here denoted a⊙ and a©. Idea © is switched to ⊙ with probability g(a⊙, a©) depending
on these payoffs. An analogous process occurs in the population of ideas of player B. The non-negative function
g(·, ·) is increasing in the first argument, and decreasing in the second. It defines the mechanics of the evolutionary
process. See also the text in Secs. 3.3 and 4.1 for further details.
The ideas that are more frequent in the player’s mind will be used more often than those which
are present less in the population. The composition of the player’s mind thus represents their
mixed strategy. Over time the player learns from past experience, and the population of ideas
in their mind undergoes an evolutionary process: less successful ideas are displaced by more
successful strategies. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, and akin to well-known birth-death processes
in evolutionary dynamics [11]. It is hence no surprise that the equations governing multi-player
learning can be very similar to those used to model evolutionary dynamics [9, 12].
Most existing analogies between learning and evolutionary dynamics are at the level of deter-
ministic differential equations though, formally describing the dynamics of infinite populations.
At the same time, evolutionary dynamics in finite populations shows several phenomena that
arise solely from intrinsic stochasticity. These effects include noise-driven fixation and extinc-
tion, which are not captured by deterministic approaches. A substantial amount of work is
available on the dynamics of stochastic birth-death processes, including an analytical formalism
to compute fixation probabilities and the times to fixation, see for example [13, 14, 15, 11].
The main purpose of the present work is to develop a microscopic representation of reinforcement
learning as a stochastic evolutionary process in a finite population of ideas. Ideas in this de-
scription are members of a finite populations, and undergo a birth-death process. This approach
allows us to establish the analogy between learning and evolution at the level of stochastic pop-
4ulation dynamics. More specifically we will define the transition rates of a birth-death process
in a population of ideas, such that the deterministic description in the limit of infinite popula-
tions reproduces the so-called Sato-Crutchfield differential equations [12, 16]. We show that the
notion of reproductive fitness needs to be augmented by an entropic restoring force to capture
weak decision preferences and/or memory loss in game learning. These restoring forces play a
role similar to that of mutation in evolutionary dynamics. Crucially, however, the birth-death
dynamics in finite populations of ideas has absorbing states so that ideas can go extinct or reach
fixation. This marks a key difference compared to mutation-selection dynamics, where there are
no absorbing states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we briefly summarize the mathe-
matics of the standard replicator dynamics and of the reinforcement learning dynamics we use
as a basis for the evolution of ideas. In Sec. 3 we then introduce the birth-death process for
finite populations of ideas, and we study its properties for simple symmetric games. In Sec. 4
we extend the analysis to two-player learning in asymmetric games. Finally in Sec. 5 we collect
our conclusions and present an outlook towards future work. Further technical details of our
analysis can be found in the Supplementary Material.
2 Deterministic evolutionary dynamics and adaptive learning
2.1 Evolutionary dynamics and replicator equations
2.1.1 Single-population replicator equations
The evolutionary dynamics of interacting individuals in infinite populations is frequently de-
scribed by replicator or replicator-mutator equations. These are deterministic ordinary differ-
ential equations. We focus on a population of individuals of S different types, i = 1, . . . , S,
and write xi(t) for the fraction of individuals of type i in the population at time t, and
x = (x1, . . . , xS). At all times
∑
i xi(t) = 1. We assume that individuals interact in a sym-
metric two-player normal form game [17]. This is specified by a payoff matrix A = (aij). The
entry aij is the payoff to an individual of type i in an interaction with an individual of type j.
The setup of a symmetric game is not to be confused with a game for which the payoff matrix
is symmetric, i.e. its own transpose.
The average payoff per game to an individual of type i in a population of composition x is given
by pii(x) =
∑
j aijxj . In order to keep the notation compact, we will omit the argument x in
the following. The standard replicator equations are then given by [17]
x˙i = xi(pii − pi), (1)
5with pi =
∑
j xjpij . These dynamics can be derived from a birth-death process in the limit of an
infinite population. This will be discussed in more detail below.
2.1.2 Two-population replicator dynamics
The case of asymmetric games refers to situations in which different individuals take on different
roles, e.g. male and female in Dawkin’s battle of the sexes [18], or buyers and sellers in a
stock market. In this case individuals belonging to different populations. In two-population
replicator systems the fitness of individuals in population A is determined by their interaction
with individuals in population B, and vice versa. Selection and evolution then occur within each
population; see [17] for details. This leads to the following two-population replicator dynamics:
x˙Ai = x
A
i (pi
A
i − piA), (2a)
x˙Bi = x
B
i (pi
B
i − piB), (2b)
where xAi is the frequency with which individuals of type i occur in population A, and x
B
i the
frequency with which the i-th type occurs in population B. It is important to note that the
label i in either population is a simple numbering of pure strategies, e.g. in Dawkin’s battle of
the sexes i = 1, 2 in the populations of males may refer to ‘faithful’ and ‘philanderer’, and in
the population of females the same labels may refer to ‘coy’ and ‘fast’ [18, 19].
In the above equations we have used the shorthands,
piAi =
∑
j
aijx
B
j , (3a)
piBi =
∑
j
bijx
A
j , (3b)
as well as piA =
∑
i pi
A
i x
A
i and similarly pi
B =
∑
i pi
B
i x
B
i .
2.2 Discrete-time Sato-Crutchfield learning
Following [16, 12] we consider two players, labelled A and B repeatedly playing an asymmetric
game with payoff matrices A (B) for player A (B). For simplicity, we will assume that both
players have the same number S of actions available, but the extension to the more general case
is straightforward [16]. Hence A and B will be S×S matrices, with entries denoted aij and bji,
i, j = 1, . . . , S. As implied in (3a) and (3b) above, aij is the payoff to player A if she chooses
action i while player B plays action j; bji is the payoff to player B in this situation.
6At each instance of the game, each player µ ∈ {A,B} will choose one action. In order to monitor
the relative success of the different actions, each player holds an ‘attraction’ for each action. We
will write Qµi (t) for the attraction player µ has for action i at time t. Sato-Crutchfield learning
assumes a soft-max (or logit) rule to convert a set of attractionsQµ1 , . . . , Q
µ
S into a mixed strategy,
xµi =
exp(ΓQµi )∑
j exp(ΓQ
µ
j )
. (4)
The parameter Γ ≥ 0 represents the intensity of choice as in [5, 20, 3]. When Γ = 0 attractions
play no role and players choose their actions with equal probability. In the limit Γ→∞ players
play a pure strategy that always chooses the action with the highest attraction.
In [16, 12] the preferences for the different actions are updated in discrete time. It is also
assumed that a large (formally infinite) number of rounds of the game is played in between such
updates, and that player A observes player B’s actions and vice versa. Each agent then has full
knowledge of the other agent’s mixed strategy. This is a simplification of the model, which was
made for convenience in [16] and results in a full deterministic dynamics. The learning dynamics
remains stochastic if the number of observations made between updates is finite [21, 22].
Proceeding on the basis of a deterministic dynamics, Sato-Crutchfield learning takes the form
QAi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QAi (t) +
∑
j
aijx
B
j (t), (5a)
QBi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QBi (t) +
∑
j
bijx
A
j (t). (5b)
The parameter α describes geometric discounting over time. For α = 0 the players have full
memory of the past, and the attraction Qµi (t) represents the total payoff player µ ∈ {A,B}
would have achieved up to time t given the other player’s actions, and if µ had always used
action i. For positive values of α more recent rounds contribute more to the attraction than
iterations of the game in the distant past. The parameter α is restricted to the range 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
2.3 Continuous-time limit and modified replicator equations
Combining Eqs. (4, 5a, 5b) one finds
xµi (t+ 1) =
[xµi (t)]
1−α exp (Γpiµi )∑
j [x
µ
j (t)]
1−α exp
(
Γpiµj
) . (6)
In order to derive a continuous-time limit we formally rescale the time step of learning to be ∆t
(so that t+ 1 on the LHS of Eq. (6) becomes t+ ∆t). We also rescale the model parameters and
7write α∆t instead of α, and Γ∆t instead of Γ. Then taking the limit ∆t→ 0 we find
x˙µi = Γx
µ
i
piµi −∑
j
piµj x
µ
j
− λ
lnxµi −∑
j
xµj lnx
µ
j
 , (7)
where λ = α/Γ. The first term on the right-hand side is the expression known from the standard
multi-population replicator dynamics in Eq. (2a) and (2b). The term proportional to λ exerts
a force towards a uniformly mixed strategy, xµi = 1/S. This ‘entropic’ force will be strong when
either the intensity of choice is low (players tend to choose their actions at random), or when
memory loss is quick (propensities do not become sufficiently different to discriminate effectively
between actions).
We conclude this section by two brief, but consequential observations. First, the flow of the
replicator Eqs. (2a) and (2b) can be towards stable fixed points at which one or several of the
actions are not played (i.e. xµi = 0). This cannot occur in the Sato-Crutchfield equations when
λ > 0. Any attracting fixed points must be in the interior of strategy space. Secondly we note
that the Sato-Crutchfield equations (7) can be written in the form of conventional replicator
equations
x˙µi = Γx
µ
i
fµi −∑
j
xµj f
µ
j
 (8)
by introducing a modified fitness as
fµi = pi
µ
i − λ lnxµi . (9)
This will be the starting point for our construction of an individual-based model for the evolution
of a population of ideas.
3 Stochastic dynamics in finite populations: the case of sym-
metric games
3.1 Birth-death dynamics
To briefly recall the main features of simple birth death processes [11, 13] we consider a pop-
ulation of N individuals, each of which can be of one of two types, i = 1, 2. We write n for
the number of individuals of type 1; the remaining N − n individuals are of type 2. Evolution
proceeds in this population via a continuous-time Markov process with transition rates T+n from
state n to state n+ 1, and T−n from state n to state n− 1. In the context of evolutionary games
8these rates are of the general form (see for example [23])
T+n =
n(N − n)
N
g(pi1, pi2), (10a)
T−n =
n(N − n)
N
g(pi2, pi1), (10b)
where pi1 = [a11n+a12(N−n)]/N is the fitness of an individual of type 1 in the population, with
an analogous expression for pi2. The rates scale linearly with the population size N – this is a
standard choice [11, 23], which implies that time is effectively measured in units of generations.
From these rates a deterministic dynamics is obtained in the limit N → ∞ [11]. For large
(formally infinite) populations and writing x = n/N , one finds
x˙ = x(1− x) [g(pi1, pi2)− g(pi2, pi1)] . (11)
A commonly used choice for the function g(·, ·) is the so-called linear pairwise comparison process
[23, 11],
g(pi1, pi2) =
1
2
[1 + Γ(pi1 − pi2)] (12)
where the parameter Γ ≥ 0 is chosen small enough to ensure that g ≥ 0 for all x. The duplicate
use of Γ is intentional, as will become clear shortly. With the above choice of g one obtains
x˙ = Γx(1− x) (pi1 − pi2) , (13)
Modulo the constant pre-factor Γ this is easily shown to be the replicator equation (1) with
S = 2.
3.2 Interpretation of fitness in the linear pairwise comparison process
We digress briefly in this subsection to discuss how individuals in the above birth-death dynamics
have access to their fitness, i.e. their average payoff.
A common interpretation of fitness functions of the type pii =
∑
j aijxj requires a fast interaction
time scale on which individuals face each other in the game [21, 22, 24]. The evolutionary
dynamics is assumed to be a (much) slower process; it can therefore draw on knowledge of pii as
defined above.
One particular advantage of the linear pairwise comparison process (12) is that it does not require
such a separation of time scales between interaction and evolution. Instead one can construct
the evolutionary process as follows: for any (potential) birth-death event an ordered triplet of
individuals from the population is picked (with replacement). We refer to the individuals in this
9triplet as “primary”, “secondary” and “adversary”, and denote their types by i1, i2, ia. Once a
triplet has been picked, the primary and secondary individual both play against the adversary
and receive payoffs ai1ia and ai2ia , respectively. The secondary individual (i2) is then replaced
by an individual of the primary type (i1) – a combined death-birth event – with probability
g(ai1ia , ai2,ia); otherwise the system is left unchanged. For the choice of g as in Eq. (12) the
Markov chain governing this process is then that described by the rates in Eq. (10a, 10b). This
is easily demonstrated for S = 2. With appropriate scaling of the rates with N we find
T+n =
n1n2
N2
[n1g(a11, a21) + n2g(a12, a22)]. (14)
The term in square brackets effectively averages over the choice of adversary. Using the specific
form of the linear pairwise comparison process in Eq. (12), this can be written as
T+n =
n1n2
N
g
(n1
N
a11 +
n2
N
a12,
n1
N
a21 +
n2
N
a22
)
, (15)
which demonstrates the equivalence.
3.3 Birth-death dynamics in a finite population of ideas
We now construct an individual-based representation of Sato-Crutchfield dynamics. Motivated
by Eq. (9) we introduce the modified fitness
fi =
∑
j
aij
nj
N
− λ ln ni
N
, (16)
which can be seen as ‘entropically’ penalizing ideas that occur very frequently, and favouring
rarer types. Focusing on the simplest case S = 2 we use birth-death rates
T+n =
n(N − n)
N
g(f1, f2), T
−
n =
n(N − n)
N
g(f2, f1). (17)
with g as defined in Eq. (12). This is a representation of Sato-Crutchfield learning in the sense
that it leads to the dynamics
x˙ = Γx(f1 − f) = Γx(pi1 − pi)− Γλx (lnx+ s) , (18)
in the limit of infinite populations. We have written s = − [x lnx+ (1− x) ln(1− x)], and
f = xf1 + (1 − x)f2. Our main focus from now on will be the behaviour of this birth-death
process in finite populations.
The parameters Γ and λ need to be chosen such that all transition rates T±n are non-negative.
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Written out explicitly the transition rates in Eq. (17), with the definition (12) are
T±n =
n(N − n)
N
1
2
[
1± Γ
(
∆pi − λ ln N − n
n
)]
. (19)
Thus, we require
Γ
∣∣∣∣∆pi − λ ln N − nn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (20)
for all n = 1, . . . , N − 1. At fixed Γ, this imposes a constraint λ < λc, where λc = O(1/ lnN) is
weakly dependent on population size; see the Supplementary Material for details. Alternatively,
one could choose a manifestly positive function g(·, ·), such as g(f1, f2) = [1 + exp(−2Γ(f1 −
f2))]
−1. The resulting dynamics is known as the Fermi process [23, 15]. While the fixed points
of the resulting deterministic dynamics are the same as for the linear comparison process, the
dynamics themselves are quantitatively different from Sato-Crutchfield dynamics. We therefore
do not pursue this route.
The expressions in Eq. (19) imply T+n = T
−
N = 0, keeping in mind that limn→0 n lnn = 0. The
states n = 0 and n = N are therefore absorbing. Accordingly, the birth-death dynamics in the
population of ideas shows fluctuation-induced extinction of ideas (or equivalently fixation). In
the remainder of this section we study these fixation phenomena in the context of simple 2× 2
games.
3.4 Application to symmetric two-player two-strategy games
We focus on three common types of games that cover the qualitatively distinct deterministic
flow patterns available under replicator dynamics. The corresponding payoff matrices are given
in Fig. 2, along with illustrations of the respective replicator flow (λ = 0). The points x = 0
and x = 1 are fixed points for all games for all values of λ.
Note that it is only asymmetric games as defined in Sec. 2.1.2 for which the deterministic
dynamics has a natural interpretation in terms of Sato-Crutchfield learning for a two-player
game. Our study of symmetric games, where the only notion of game play is in the pairwise
interaction of the individuals in a population – rather than between two distinct populations
representing players in the sense of Sato-Crutchfield – is primarily a warm-up. It will help us
identify some important mechanisms of the fixation dynamics, such as deterministic relaxation
and activation, that will be helpful in our analysis of asymmetric games in Sec. 4.
Co-existence games. The boundary fixed points (x = 0, x = 1) are unstable for co-existence
games under replicator flow, and there is a stable interior fixed point x? where both types of
ideas coexist. The memory-loss term in the Sato-Crutchfield equation (λ > 0) does not change
11
0 1 0 1
Dominance game Coordination game
0 1
Coexistence game
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. Payoff matrices A of the three main types of two-strategy two-player symmetric games, and their flow
diagrams in x ∈ [0, 1] under replicator dynamics.
the qualitative features of the flow; its main effect is to move the stable fixed point closer the
centre of the state space, as shown in Fig. 3(a). For very quick memory loss (λ 1) the fitness
fi of either type of individual is entirely dominated by the entropic term, and both types of
individuals are present with equal frequency.
The path to fixation in finite population coexistence games consists of two parts: (i) an initial
relaxation to the vicinity of the interior fixed point; (ii) activation to one of the two absorbing
states, driven by fluctuations; see also the Supplement for further discussion. Eyring-Kramers
theory [25, 26, 27] indicates that the typical time required for such an activation event grows
exponentially with the height of the relevant activation barrier, and with the inverse variance of
the noise, N . The height of the activation barrier is affected by the restoring force of the entropic
term. Accordingly, the fixation time shown in Fig. 3(b) shows a strong dependence of fixation
times on the model parameter λ at fixed N . The functional form is approximately exponential,
suggesting a linear increase in the activation barrier with λ. This is intuitively plausible in the
limit of large λ: the entropic term will dominate the dynamics, and it is linear in λ.
Dominance games. In this type of game one idea is dominant, and always has a higher
payoff than the other type of idea. The replicator flow has constant sign; for the choice of payoff
matrix in Fig. 2(b) it has an unstable fixed point at x = 0, and a stable fixed point at x = 1.
The Sato-Crutchfield dynamics at λ > 0 has an additional stable interior fixed point x?, which
approaches unity as λ → 0, see Fig. 4(a). In finite populations the dynamics is similar to that
of the coexistence game when λ > 0. After an initial relaxation towards the interior fixed point,
noise drives the system to fixation. Given that the fixed point is located close to x = 1 for
small and moderate λ, fixation will mostly occur at the upper absorbing boundary. As before
fixation times increase with λ but are rather shorter than in the coexistence game, see Fig. 4(b).
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(a) (b)
Figure 3. Co-existence game: (a) Location of fixed points of single-population Sato-Crutchfield learning,
Eq. (18). (b) Mean fixation time as a function of λ in a finite population of size N = 200, starting at initial
condition n = 100. The line is obtained using the known closed-form solution for simple birth-death processes,
see e.g. [11]. Intensity of choice is Γ = 0.1.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. Dominance game. (a) Location of fixed points of single-population Sato-Crutchfield learning,
Eq. (18). (b) Mean fixation time as a function of λ in a finite population of size N = 200, starting at initial
condition n = 100, comparing theory (continuous line) to direct numerical simulations of the dynamics (markers)
using the Gillespie algorithm. Intensity of choice is Γ = 0.1. In the inset of panel (b) we show the mean fixation
time starting from n = 1000 for a population of size 2000, where the crossover to an exponential dependence on
λ is visible at large λ.
Exponential dependence of the fixation time on λ is only seen when λ is sufficiently large so
that the internal fixed point is well separated from the absorbing states, or when the population
size is large enough for the activation barrier to show. For small and moderate values of λ
the activation barrier is too shallow relative to the noise strength for Eyring-Kramers theory to
apply.
Coordination games. In addition to the trivial fixed points at the boundaries, the replicator
dynamics of the coordination game has an unstable interior fixed point x?0. With memory-loss
13
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Coordination game. (a) Location of fixed points of single-population Sato-Crutchfield learning. (b)
Mean fixation time as a function of λ in a finite population of size N = 200, starting at initial condition n = 100,
comparing theory (continuous line) to numerical simulations of the dynamics (markers). Intensity of choice is
Γ = 0.1. In the inset of panel (b) we show the mean fixation time starting from n = 1000 for a population of size
2000.
(a) (b)
n
Figure 6. Coordination game. (a) Mean fixation time in a finite population (with Γ = 0.1) as a function
of λ, the memory-loss parameter, and for different initial conditions n. (b) Mean fixation time as a function of
the initial condition for two fixed values λ indicated by arrows in (a). We show data for a larger population size
N = 1000 to reveal the non-monotonicities in λ. In (b), vertical lines indicate the initial conditions used in (a).
Also shown are the times taken under the deterministic dynamics (dashed lines) to get from the initial condition
to within c/N of the stable fixed point; the order unity constant c is chosen to give a good description of the
actual fixation times for initial conditions near the fixed point.
(λ > 0) the dynamics develops a more intricate structure, see Fig. 5. At small but non-zero λ
there are five fixed points. As λ is increased, two of these fixed points merge in a saddle-node
bifurcation; we denote the corresponding value of λ by λc. For stronger memory loss there are
three fixed points, but with reversed stability compared to the situation at λ = 0: unstable fixed
points at x = 0 and x = 1, and a stable interior fixed point whose location depends on λ.
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For λ < λc and initial conditions n/N = x > x
?
0, i.e. above the unstable fixed point in the lower
left of Fig. 5(a), fixation takes place as in the dominance game by deterministic relaxation to the
stable fixed point near x = 1, followed by noise-driven absorption. The increase of the fixation
time with λ is shown in Fig. 5(b) and is qualitatively similar to the behaviour for the dominance
game as plotted in Fig. 4(b).
For initial conditions with x < x?0, the behaviour of the system and the resulting fixation time
is more intricate, as shown in Fig. 6. Panel (a) demonstrates that the fixation time can now
exhibit a non-monotonic dependence on the strength of memory loss λ, provided the starting
point is sufficiently close to the location of the saddle-node bifurcation. The data in panel (b)
show that the starting point has a non-trivial influence on fixation time.
This dependence on the initial condition x for λ < λc can be understood as follows. If x is
smaller than the unstable (interior) fixed point at the given λ, deterministic relaxation will be
to the stable fixed point at lower x, and activation from there will accordingly be to x = 0 rather
than x = 1. A more detailed analysis for large N can be found in the Supplement. This shows
that close to the bifurcation, activation towards x = 0 is slower – exponentially in N – than
across the barrier to the stable fixed point at large x, so the system follows the latter route and
eventually reaches x = 1. We emphasize that this is a non-trivial prediction for the dynamics
in finite populations; it cannot be deduced from the deterministic Sato-Crutchfield dynamics..
Moving beyond the bifurcation (λ > λc), the situation is simpler again. For sufficiently large N
one predicts fixation by relaxation directly to the stable fixed point close to x = 1, and activation
to x = 1 from there. In Fig. 7(a) one can see that the system relaxes to the stable fixed point
close to x = 1 following the deterministic dynamics, then fixation occurs by activation. For
small N and close to the bifurcation threshold, the system might initially stay in a region of
relatively weak deterministic flow (see Fig. 7(b)). A detailed analysis of this phenomenon is
deferred to the Supplement.
3.5 Comparison with replicator-mutator dynamics
The effect of the entropic term in the Sato-Crutchfield equations is akin to that of mutation
in evolutionary processes. Such mutation dynamics is discussed in [28, 29], for example. Both
mutation and entropic terms describe forces that act towards the centre of strategy space and
drive the population away from states in which one species (or one idea) dominates, and we here
include a brief comparison. We choose the replicator-mutator equation of the form discussed
in [23]
x˙ =
(
1− u
2
)
x(1− x)(pi1 − pi2)− u
2
(
x− 1
2
)
, (21)
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Figure 7. Sample trajectories of a coordination game, for different initial conditions; Γ = 0.1, λ = 0.36 and
N = 1000 (coloured curves). The black curves show the trajectory for the deterministic dynamics (8) starting
from the same set of initial conditions. The trajectories follow the deterministic dynamics fairly closely for initial
conditions x = 0.5 and 0.8. For initial condition x = 0.2, fluctuations determine how fast the system escapes from
the initial region of relatively weak deterministic flow. For initial x = 0.05, this effect is even stronger. One of
the two trajectories shown also illustrates direct activation, to fixation at x = 0, against the deterministic flow.
(S-C)
(R-M)
(R-M)
(S-C)
Coexistence game  Dominance game   Coordination game
Figure 8. Fixed point diagrams of Sato-Crutchfield (S-C) learning (18), (blue and red lines), and replicator-
mutator (R-M) dynamics (21) (black lines) for our three types of symmetric 2 × 2 games. The full black lines
show the stable fixed points of the replicator-mutator dynamics and the dashed line its unstable fixed points.
where u > 0 is the mutation rate. In order to compare the effects of mutation with those
of memory loss in the learning process, we show the bifurcation diagrams of the replicator-
mutator dynamics along with those of Sato-Crutchfield learning in Fig. 8, for the three classes
of symmetric games we have considered. The main difference between the two flows is that
Sato-Crutchfield dynamics has additional fixed points at x = 0 and x = 1. As these are unstable
for λ > 0, they do not lead to qualitative differences in the long-time deterministic dynamics.
However, for finite N the difference is significant: replicator-mutator dynamics does not have
absorbing states, so the question of fixation does not arise.
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4 Asymmetric games and multiple populations of ideas
4.1 Birth-death dynamics for multiple populations of ideas
In this section we extend the stochastic dynamics for populations of ideas to games with mul-
tiple populations. We focus on the simplest case of two-player two-strategy games, though the
approach easily extends to more general games. Our starting point are the Sato-Crutchfield
equations (7), which simplify to
x˙A = ΓxA(piA1 − piA)− ΓλxA
(
lnxA + sA
)
, (22a)
x˙B = ΓxB(piB1 − piB)− ΓλxB
(
lnxB + sB
)
, (22b)
where piA1 = a11x
B+a12(1−xB), piA2 = a21xB+a22(1−xB), with analogous expressions for piB1 and
piB2 . We have also written pi
A = xApiA1 +(1−xA)piA2 , and sA = −
[
xA lnxA + (1− xA) ln(1− xA)].
Similar definitions apply to piB and sB. The variable xA denotes the probability with which
player A chooses their action 1 and similarly for xB.
The stochastic evolutionary dynamics now occurs in two finite populations of ideas, one for
either player, each consisting of N individuals. We write n for the number of ideas of type 1 in
population A, and similarly m for the number of ideas of type 1 in population B. The dynamics
is defined by the rates for birth-death transitions in population A, (n,m)→ (n± 1,m),
TA+(n,m) =
1
2
n(N − n)
N
[
1 + Γ
(
piA1 − piA2 − λ ln
n
N − n
)]
, (23a)
TA−(n,m) =
1
2
n(N − n)
N
[
1 + Γ
(
piA2 − piA1 − λ ln
N − n
n
)]
, (23b)
and analogous rates for transitions (n,m)→ (n,m± 1) in population B
TB+(n,m) =
1
2
m(N −m)
N
[
1 + Γ
(
piB1 − piB2 − λ ln
m
N −m
)]
, (24a)
TB−(n,m) =
1
2
m(N −m)
N
[
1 + Γ
(
piB2 − piB1 − λ ln
N −m
m
)]
. (24b)
The two-population birth-death dynamics has four absorbing states, (n,m) = (0, 0), (0, N),
(N, 0), (N,N) in finite populations. In the limit N → ∞ and writing xA = n/N as well as
xB = m/N , this process leads to the deterministic two-population Sato-Crutchfield equations
(22a) and (22b).
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Figure 9. Two-population replicator flows for different types of 2×2 asymmetric games: (a) the Matching Pennies
game is a zero-sum game; the replicator dynamics has a conserved quantity and exhibits cyclic trajectories. The
game (b) has one pure-strategy fixed point while (c) has a hyperbolic fixed point. Stable fixed points are labeled
by full dots, saddles (fixed points with one unstable and one stable direction) by triangles, unstable fixed points
(two unstable directions) by empty dots and finally cyclic fixed points (whose Jacobian eigenvalues are purely
imaginary) by a cross.
4.2 Examples of two-player two-strategy asymmetric games
We now study the corresponding fixation properties, focusing on a few key examples of asymmet-
ric two-player games, chosen from the different categories of possible two-population replicator
flows [17]: (i) the so-called Matching Pennies game, also known as Dawkin’s Battle of the
Sexes [18]; (ii) games in which one player has an action that strictly dominates the alternative
action; and (iii) games in which the replicator flow has a hyperbolic interior fixed point. The
three cases are illustrated in Fig. 9.
Matching Pennies game. This game is represented by the following payoff bi-matrix
A =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
, B =
(
−1 1
1 −1
)
. (25)
In addition to the trivial fixed points at the corners of phase space the replicator dynamics
(λ = 0) has the fixed point x? = (xA, xB) = (0.5, 0.5). Trajectories that start elsewhere will
form closed periodic orbits around the fixed point as shown in Fig. 10(a). Fixation in one of the
four corners in finite populations will therefore be due to radial diffusion. Diffusion distances
generally grow as
√
Dt. As the diffusion constant is D ∼ 1/N in our case, covering a radial
distance of order unity to reach one of the two corners requires time t ∼ N . This linear growth
of fixation time with population size is shown in Fig. 10(d).
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Figure 10. Matching Pennies game. (a,b) Flow under deterministic Sato-Crutchfield learning for λ = 0
and λ = 0.3, respectively. Overlaid is a heat map indicating the fixation time as a function of the starting point
(obtained from the backward master equation [30] for a system of size N = 30); (c) Fixation time from simulations
as a function of λ, for population size N = 100 and (n,m) = (N/2, N/2) as initial condition. Panels (d, e) show
fixation time τN/2,N/2 against N for λ = 0 and λ = 0.3, respectively. Panel (d) shows linear scaling of fixation
time with N (solid line) consistent with fixation by radial diffusion, whereas panel (e) displays approximately
exponential scaling (see log-linear plot in inset) as fixation now requires activation against the flow.
The effect can be seen as an analogue of the trapping in regions of low flow discussed in the
Supplement, but here the (radial) flow is zero over an extended region rather than at a single
point, causing a stronger fixation time growth (N versus lnN) with population size.
As soon as one has nonzero memory loss λ, the point x? becomes an attractor of the dynamics,
with the whole state space as basin of attraction as shown in Fig. 10(b). As before, fixation will
therefore proceed along the sequence of relaxation to this fixed point followed by activation to
one of the absorbing states. The activation phase again requires a time scaling exponentially
with the population size N . This change in scaling is clear by comparing Figs. 10(d) and (e) and
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Figure 11. Matching Pennies game. Sample trajectories in a population of size N = 500 and with Γ = 0.1,
for (a) λ = 0 and (b) λ = 0.3. We show the distance d of (xA, xB) from the fixed point at (0.5, 0.5) versus time t in
log-linear scale, to focus on the radial motion. Note the difference between diffusive dynamics in (a) – the dashed
line shows the expected power law 1/2 for a diffusive process – and activation in (b). For the latter we plot the
beginning of the trajectory, showing how the system reaches a metastable steady state where it fluctuates around
the centre of the state space (d = 0), and on the right the end of the fixation trajectory where a fluctuation takes
the system to one of the four absorbing states at time tf .
emphasizes that the addition of the entropic term in the fitness has qualitative consequences for
the fixation dynamics. The sample trajectories in Fig. 11 further illustrate this.
When λ becomes large, the flow and hence the activation barrier becomes proportional to λ
to leading order, producing fixation times that scale exponentially with λ as can be seen in
Fig. 10(c).
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Dominance game. An example of this case is defined by the payoff structure
A =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
, B =
(
0 1
1 0
)
(26)
Its Sato-Crutchfield dynamics for λ = 0 has four fixed points in the corners of the state space,
one of which is stable. Fixation will then typically proceed by deterministic relaxation to this
fixed point. For infinite N this would take infinite time as the approach to the fixed point is
exponential. At finite N , one expects that fixation takes place once this exponential approach
gets within distance 1/N – the grid spacing in the (xA, xB)-plane – of the fixed point. The
fixation time should then scale logarithmically with N ; the data in Fig. 12(d) are consistent
with this.
As the memory-loss parameter λ is increased from zero, the stable fixed point moves continuously
towards the centre of the state space, with all four corners then unstable fixed points. (There are
also two additional saddle points on the boundary near the original stable fixed point.) Fixation
will take place by relaxation followed by activation, resulting in exponential growth of fixation
times with N (Fig. 12(e)) and, at large λ, also with λ (Fig. 12(c)). The sample trajectories in
Fig. 13 illustrate the qualitative differences between the fixation dynamics for λ = 0 and λ > 0.
Hyperbolic game. An example of this class of games is given by the payoff matrices
A =
(
2 0
0 1
)
, B =
(
1 0
0 2
)
(27)
For λ = 0, the Sato-Crutchfield dynamics has one saddle point in the interior of the state space,
two stable fixed points in two opposite corners of the state space, and two unstable fixed points
in the remaining corners; cf. Fig. 14. As for the dominance game, fixation will proceed by
deterministic relaxation, leading to exponential approach to one of the two stable fixed points.
Logarithmic growth with N of fixation times should again result, though we have not verified
this explicitly.
Each of the two stable fixed points has its own basin of attraction. This is a new feature compared
to the dominance game. For N → ∞, the location in strategy space where fixation occurs will
be entirely determined by which basin the system starts off in. For finite N , fluctuation effects
will then make the choice of fixation location stochastic.
With increasing λ, the two stable fixed points in the corners move to the interior of the state
space. At a critical value λc, these two fixed points merge with the saddle point into a single
stable fixed point. (This is the consequence of a symmetry in our payoff matrices; without
this, the saddle would annihilate with one stable fixed point and the other would survive.) The
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Figure 12. Dominance game. (a,b) Flow under deterministic Sato-Crutchfield learning for λ = 0 and λ = 0.5,
respectively. Overlaid is a heat map indicating the mean fixation time as a function of the starting point (obtained
from the backward master equation for a system of size N = 30); (c) Fixation time from Gillespie simulations as
a function of λ, for population size N = 100 and (n,m) = (N/2, N/2) as initial condition. (d, e) Fixation time
τN/2,N/2 against N for λ = 0 and 0.5, respectively. The fixation time in (d) exhibits logarithmic scaling with
N resulting from the exponential approach to the stable fixed point. The scaling of the fixation time in (e) is
approximately exponential with N because fixation involves activation.
presence of this bifurcation would suggest, by analogy with the results for the coordination
game, a non-monotonic dependence of the fixation time on λ near λc. Presumably the values
of N required to see this will be large again, however, and we were unable to reach them in
the two-population case with reasonable computational effort. Nonetheless, Fig. 15 illustrates
clearly that as λ varies, the different fixed point structures of the deterministic dynamics cause
qualitative changes in the fixation trajectories.
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(a) (b)
Figure 13. Dominance game. Sample trajectories in a population of size N = 500 and with Γ = 0.1, for (a)
λ = 0 and (b) λ = 0.5. We show xA against time (linear axis in (a), logarithmic axis in (b)). The full and dashed
horizontal lines show the xA-coordinate of the stable and unstable fixed points of the deterministic dynamics, see
also Fig. 12.
λ=0 λ =0.6 λ =0.8
80
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20
0
Figure 14. Hyperbolic game. Flow under deterministic Sato-Crutchfield learning for λ = 0, 0.6 and 0.8,
respectively. Overlaid is in each panel a heat map showing the mean fixation time as a function of starting point
in a system of size N = 30. The three chosen values of λ show different fixed point structures as indicated by the
symbols.
5 Summary and outlook
We have interpreted learning in games as a pairwise comparison process within a population
of ideas. In the limit of large population size, the dynamics is described by the deterministic
Sato-Crutchfield equations. While these equations for learning have been widely studied, there
has (to our knowledge) not been any systematic derivation from a birth-death process in finite
populations. Such individual-based foundations are only available for simpler replicator (or
replicator-mutator) dynamics [19, 11, 23]. We fill this gap by defining such an individual-based
process in a finite population of ideas. The construction in Sec. 3.3 and 4.1 involves augmenting
the standard fitness function by a term proportional to the information content (− lnxi) of
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Figure 15. Hyperbolic game. Sample trajectories in a population of size N = 500 and with Γ = 0.1, for (a)
λ = 0, (b) 0.6 and (c) 0.8, in the same representation as in Fig. 13. Panel (a) shows relaxation to the region
around the saddle point, with fluctuations then determining at which boundary fixed point fixation occurs. The
trajectories in (b) start similarly but then are driven to one of two interior stable fixed points, from which fixation
proceeds by activation to the nearest boundary. In (c), all trajectories go to the single interior fixed point, from
which fixation by activation occurs to one of two boundary fixed points (top right and bottom left in right-hand
panel of Fig. 14).
species i. While the behaviour of deterministic Sato-Crutchfield learning in continuous time is
fairly similar to the outcome of replicator-mutator dynamics in infinite populations, there are
marked differences between their stochastic representations in finite systems. Mutation processes
prevent fixation or extinction, but these phenomena can and will occur in finite populations of
ideas, even at non-zero memory loss.
In order to develop some intuition for the general phenomena that can occur in finite populations
of ideas we first studied three types of symmetric games (Sec. 3.4). We focused on the depen-
dence of the fixation dynamics on the size of the population and on the memory-loss parameter
λ. In our interpretation this latter parameter becomes the strength of the preference for rare
ideas. The variety of different behaviours observed could be understood by decomposing the
fixation dynamics into a sequence of elementary events, such as relaxation to stable fixed points
and activation against the deterministic flow driven by demographic noise. We then broadened
our analysis to include asymmetric two-player games (Sec. 4.2). Further features of the dynam-
ics are then observed, such as fixation by diffusion when the relevant part of the dynamics is
not opposed by the deterministic flow.
Most of our results are obtained from direct Gillespie simulations of the stochastic evolution of
ideas, or from numerical solutions of the corresponding backward master equation. In the case
of symmetric games we have complemented this with an analysis for large population size N
(see Sec. C of the Supplement). This allows one to identify the dominant scaling of fixation
times and reveals subtle effects that cannot be deduced from the fixed point structure of the
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dynamics (Sec. B of the Supplement). For asymmetric games there is in general no mapping to
noisy descent on an effective potential energy, because of the lack of detailed balance. However,
as discussed e.g. by Bouchet et al. in [31], one should – in principle – be able to obtain fixation
times for large N by using Freidlin-Wentzell large deviation theory. This is left to future work.
We think our work will enrich the mathematical theory of learning and evolutionary dynamics,
providing a novel interpretation of learning in games with imperfect memory as a pairwise
matching process between ideas. Our construction places the dynamics of learning in the context
of stochastic population dynamics, and, we hope, it will encourage further studies of learning
based on the established toolbox for evolutionary dynamics in finite populations.
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iStochastic evolution in populations of ideas
Supplementary Material
Robin Nicole, Peter Sollich, Tobias Galla
A Limits on birth-death description of Sato-Crutchfield learn-
ing
The parameters Γ and λ of the stochastic evolution of ideas we have defined need to be chosen so
that all transition rates T±n in Eq. (19) are non-negative. Except in the case of pure replicator
dynamics (λ = 0), this gives constraints on the parameters that depend on population size N ,
though weakly. The reason is the logarithmic term in the fitness (16), which can get as large as
−λ ln(1/N).
For fixed Γ the rates will only remain non-negative if λ ≤ λc. One can compute a lower bound
for λc. Firstly, all the transition rates will be positive if and only if the constraint∣∣∣∣∆pi − λ ln N − nn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1Γ (28)
is met for all 0 < n < N . Since the quantity ∆pi = pi1 − pi2 varies linearly with n, it is bounded
by ∆pi(1) and ∆pi(N − 1). Applying the triangular inequality to (28) gives:∣∣∣∣∆pi − λ ln N − nn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ max (|∆pi(1)| , |∆pi(N − 1)|) + λ ln(N − 1) (29)
As a consequence, all transition rates are positive as long as max (|∆pi(1)| , |∆pi(N − 1)|) +
λ ln(N − 1) ≤ 1/Γ. This translates into
λ ≤ 1
ln(N − 1)
(
1
Γ
−max (|∆pi(1)| , |∆pi(N − 1)|)
)
(30)
The right-hand side therefore provides a lower bound on the critical value λc. This bound is
plotted as a function of N in Fig. S1. While the bound goes to zero for N → ∞, the inverse
logarithmic dependence means it does so extremely slowly: the restriction on the allowed range
of λ is therefore mild even for very large population sizes (N ∼ 108 and beyond).
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Positive 
transition rates
Figure S1. Lower bound on λc for a coexistence game as defined in section 3.4, for Γ = 0.1. The bound (black
line) is inversely proportional to the logarithm of the population size N .
B Non-monotonicity of the fixation time in a coordination game
In section 3.4, we studied fixation in a coordination game and observed that the fixation time
is non monotonic in λ close to the bifurcation threshold λc, for small N . We will provide
an explanation for this phenomenon by decomposing the dynamics leading to fixation into
a sequence of elementary events. When N is small enough for activation times to be only
moderate, beyond the bifurcation threshold, two additional effects come into play in addition to
the relaxation and activation processes observed for large N : (i) direct activation: when starting
near x = 0, a fluctuation (activation event) can drive the system straight to fixation at x = 0,
even though the deterministic relaxation would take it in the other direction; (ii) trapping in
regions near deterministic fixed points, where the net (deterministic) flow is low; deterministic
relaxation times can then become comparable to activation times (precisely at such a fixed point,
the deterministic relaxation time is in fact infinite as the flow vanishes). Finite populations will
stay trapped in these regions of low deterministic flow for a long (but finite) time. This time
will grow logarithmically with N as explained in this Supplementary Material, Sec. D. Such
regions exist at and near the bifurcation at λc, both for λ below and above λc.
The curve in Fig. 6(b) for λ = 0.475 shows the first effect: for small initial values of x, fixation
times are rather low, as direct activation towards x = 0 is the dominant fixation mechanism. To
the right of the maximum in the curve, on the other hand, we have fixation predominantly at
x = 1. The fixation time here is, to a good approximation, given by the deterministic relaxation
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time to the stable fixed point close to x = 1, with the final activation to x = 1 being sufficiently
fast to be sub-leading.
Accordingly, the sample trajectories in Fig. 7 show that the system moves to the stable fixed
point in a close-to-deterministic fashion, with fixation at x = 1 occurring shortly afterwards.
The second effect above contributes to the initial condition-dependence of the fixation time in
Fig. 6. Here we are close enough to the bifurcation to have an extended region of low flow,
causing a significant peak in the transition time curve. The low flow also makes fluctuation
effects significant as explained above, and these cause deviations from the times predicted for
purely deterministic relaxation. In Fig. 7, the sample trajectories that start from n = 200
(x = 0.2) illustrate this effect.
Finally, the low flow also makes direct activation to x = 0 fast, giving a larger region of initial x
where this is the main fixation mechanism. As is clear from Fig. 6(b), the resulting movement
of the peak in the fixation time is what causes the non-monotonic λ-dependence at fixed initial
condition that is visible in Fig. 6(a). We refer to one of the two sample trajectories starting
from n = 50 (x = 0.05) in Fig. 7 for an illustration of a direct activation event.
We note that the direct activation effects discussed above for the coordination game do occur also
for coexistence and dominance games, with the same consequence that fixation times become
small for initial conditions near x = 0. These other games do not have the additional features
arising from the bifurcation in the coordination game, however, so do not show non-monotonic
variation of the fixation time with λ.
C Activation dynamics in stochastic evolution of ideas for sym-
metric games
Here, we explain how to obtain the large N -behaviour of activation times in our stochastic
evolution for a population of ideas, and discuss the consequences for the fixation dynamics.
C.1 Kramers-Moyal expansion and effective potential
Our starting point is the dynamics defined by the transition rates (10a) and (10b). We have
discussed in the main text how for N → ∞ this leads to deterministic dynamics, here – by
our construction – the Sato-Crutchfield equation (18). This can formally be derived from a
Kramer-Moyal expansion to lowest order. In order to capture stochastic effects, one retains the
first sub-leading order in the expansion. This is standard for evolutionary processes [1], and
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Figure S2. Different types of fixation dynamics in the coordination game with the payoff matrix of Fig. 2,
superimposed onto the fixed point structure of Fig. 5(a). For values of λ below the bifurcation threshold, the
potential formalism allows one to identify three different zones [(i), (iv) and (iii), with the latter covering only a
very narrow λ-range] with qualitatively different fixation dynamics; see Fig. S4. Note that this subdivision into
three zones cannot be deduced from the deterministic Sato-Crutchfield dynamics and its fixed point structure
(Sec. 3.4) alone.
leads to an Ito¯ stochastic differential equation of the form
x˙ = h(x) +
1√
N
σ(x)ξ(t), (31)
where ξ(t) is Gaussian white noise of unit variance, 〈ξ(t)ξ(t′)〉 = δ(t − t′). For the birth-death
process discussed in Sec. 3 one finds
h(x) = Γx(1− x)
(
pi1(x)− pi2(x)− λ ln
(
x
1− x
))
, (32a)
σ(x) =
√
x(1− x). (32b)
Our aim is to use Eyring-Kramers theory [2], and so we map the above dynamics with mul-
tiplicative noise to one with additive noise. This is standard for systems with one degree of
freedom, and is achieved by a change of variable from x to
y(x) ≡
∫ x
0
dx′
σ(x′)
= 2 arcsin(
√
x) (33)
vand conversely x(y) = sin2(y/2). Translating the dynamics of x to one for y gives
y˙(t) =
h (x(y))
σ (x(y))
− 1
2N
σ′(x(y))
σ2(x(y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
neglected
+
1√
N
ξ(t) (34)
The additional flow term with prefactor 1N arises from the x-dependence of the original noise
variance σ2(x). We will see shortly that this term can be neglected in determining the leading
(exponential in N) scaling of activation times. The y-dynamics can now be written in the form
y˙(t) = −ΓdVy
dy
+
1√
N
ξ(t) (35)
with
Vy(y) = − 1
Γ
∫ y
0
dy′
h(x(y′))
σ(x(y′))
+O(1/N) (36)
Now that we have a standard Langevin equation with additive noise, Eyring-Kramers theory
tells us that the time for an activated event, say from a stable fixed point y1 to an unstable fixed
point (barrier state) y2 or to a boundary, scales as exp{NΓ[Vy(y2) − Vy(y1)]}. It follows that
the O(1/N) term in Vy will only contribute to the prefactor, which we are not considering here
anyway; it can therefore be neglected. More importantly, if we translate back from y to x the
potential takes the simple form
V (x) = Vy(y(x)) = − 1
Γ
∫ x
0
dx′
σ(x′)
h(x′)
σ(x′)
= −
∫ x
0
dx′
[
pi1(x
′)− pi2(x′)− λ ln
(
x′
1− x′
)]
(37)
and activation times scale as
τ ∼ exp{NΓ[V (x2)− V (x1)]} (38)
This will be the basis for our further analysis. In particular, we will exploit that for large N ,
differences in activation barriers V (x2)−V (x1) translate into exponentially different timescales,
hence if there are competing processes the one with the smaller activation barrier occurs first
(with probability one as N →∞).
We add finally as a note of caution that the above Langevin analysis is valid for small Γ, where
the rates for a transition n → n + 1 and its reverse are close to each other. Otherwise a more
general approach is needed to determine activation timescales [3].
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C.2 Generic symmetric two-strategy games
We can write down the potential V (x) quite generically for a symmetric game where there are
two actions to choose from. Inserting the explicit form of the payoffs (see Eq. (3a) and (3b))
into (37), one has, up to an umimportant additive constant,
V (x) = v˜
(
x− 1
2
)
+ w˜
(
x− 1
2
)2
− λs(x) (39)
Here the entropy is s(x) = −x ln(x) − (1 − x) ln(1 − x) as before, and we have introduced the
abbreviations
v˜ =
a21 + a22 − a12 − a11
2
(40a)
w˜ =
a12 + a21 − a11 − a22
2
(40b)
For λ = 0 it is now easy to see the link to the three categories of symmetric game considered
in Sec. 3.4, bearing in mind that all stationary points of V (x) obey h(x) = 0, hence are fixed
points of the dynamics. For w > 0 and |v| < w, V (x) has a minimum in the relevant range
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and we have a coexistence game. For w < 0 and |v| < |w|, on the other hand, V (x)
has a maximum, corresponding to a coordination game. In the remaining cases, where |v| > |w|,
V (x) is monotonic for x ∈ [0, 1], so one has a dominance game.
To understand the effect of nonzero λ on V (x), note that the function −λs(x) is convex. Hence
for a coexistence game V (x) continues to have a single minimum x?. A fixation trajectory will
first relax to this minimum. The barrier to activation towards x = 0 is then V (0) − V (x?), so
fixation will occur there if this is lower than the corresponding barrier V (1)−V (x?) for fixation
at x = 1. In the opposite case, i.e. for V (0) > V (1), fixation will occur at x = 1.
For a dominance game, the inclusion of the entropic term in V (x) will create a single minimum
x? for any λ > 0, because the derivative −λs′(x) diverges to ±∞ at the two boundaries x = 0
and x = 1. The fixation dynamics then follows the same pattern as for a coexistence game.
C.3 Kramer-Moyal expansion for coordination games
The remaining case of coordination games is the most interesting, as the competition between
the maximum in V (x) at λ = 0 and the convex entropic term can create additional minima. We
keep λ > 0 from now on and write
V (x) = λ
[
v
(
x− 1
2
)
+ w
(
x− 1
2
)2
− s(x)
]
(41)
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Figure S3. Graphical representation of the definitions of ∆0 = V (0) − V (xs), ∆1 = V (1) − V (xs), B0 =
V (0)− V (x?1) and B1 = V (1)− V (x?2).
with v = v˜/λ, w = w˜/λ. The shape of V (x) is determined by these parameters, while λ only
affects the overall scale of the activation barriers but not their relative size for different processes.
We therefore drop the prefactor λ in the following.
For large v and w, corresponding to small λ at fixed v˜ and w˜, the entropic term is mostly
negligible in V (x). But its diverging derivative always dominates in V ′(x) when one is close
enough to the boundaries, so must create two minima there. We denote their positions x?1 and
x?2, respectively, and that of the intermediate maximum by xs. We also introduce
∆0 = V (0)− V (xs), ∆1 = V (1)− V (xs),
B0 = V (0)− V (x?1), B1 = V (1)− V (x?2) (42)
as illustrated in Fig. S3. As v and w change, so will the values of these barrier parameters. In
particular, the signs of ∆0 and ∆1 determine qualitatively the kind of fixation dynamics that
the system will exhibit. The regime where ∆0 and ∆1 have different signs is subdivided further
according to their relation to the barriers B0 and B1. A graphical summary is given in Fig. S4
and discussed further below. Fig. S5 shows the resulting phase diagram in the (v, w)-plane, and
summarizes to what extent fixation probabilities and fixation times depend on initial conditions
in each of the four regimes. Note that when w gets too close to zero, or |v|/|w| becomes too
large, a maximum and a minimum of V (x) can merge in a bifurcation. In the single minimum
regime beyond this, the fixation dynamics becomes simple again and has the same features as
for coexistence and dominance games. The arrow in Fig. S5 shows how the various regions of
the diagram are traversed when λ is increased at fixed v˜ and w˜, i.e. for fixed payoffs. In Fig. S2
we plot over what λ-ranges V (x) has the shapes (i), (iii) and (iv), respectively, in the specific
example game of section 3.4. The λ-range for shape (iii) is too small to see in that figure,
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(i)                                                 (ii)
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Figure S4. Schematic of the shape of the potential V (x) in the four different classes of coordination games.
Arrows on the bottom of each panel represent deterministic relaxation paths that occur during fixation (full lines)
as well as activated events driven by fluctuations (dashed lines). The legends indicate whether the large N -fixation
probability and fixation time depend on the initial position x, or are uniform in x.
(i) When ∆0 < 0 and ∆1 < 0, the barriers to fixation at the boundaries are smaller than the central barrier
separating the two potential minima x?1 and x
?
2: fixation occurs by deterministic relaxation to one of these points,
then activation to the nearest boundary.
(ii) For ∆0 > 0 and ∆1 > 0, transitions between the two potential minima are much faster than activated fixation
at either boundary. The system equilibrates between the minima, forgetting its initial condition, and fixes at the
boundary with lower V (x), here x = 1.
(iii,iv) When ∆0 < 0 and ∆1 > 0, fixation always occurs at x = 0 because from x
?
2 the system will cross the
barrier at xs to x
?
1. (iii) If the barrier crossing is faster than the final activation time towards x = 0, also the
fixation time is independent of the initial condition. (iv) Otherwise, the barrier crossing time dominates, causing
a much longer fixation time when starting from x > xs.
however.
Fig. S4(a) shows the simplest case ∆0,∆1 < 0. Here depending on its initial condition, the
system will first relax to one of the minima of the potential, say x?1. Then because ∆0 < 0 the
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barrier for activation to x = 0 is smaller than for activation to the maximum xs. For large N
– which we always assume in the following discussion – then with probability one the former
process is the first to happen: fixation occurs at x = 0. Similarly if the initial relaxation goes to
x?2 because the system started at x > xs, fixation will occur at x = 1. The fixation probability at
0 is therefore a step function of the initial condition x, dropping from one to zero at x = xs. The
fixation time changes similarly with initial condition, from exp[NΓB0] for x < xs to exp[NΓB1]
for x > xs.
The opposite case of ∆0,∆1 > 0 is illustrated in Fig. S4(b). Here once the system has landed
in either of the two minima, it will be able to reach the maximum separating these minima
much faster than a boundary. As a result the system will make many “trips” between the two
minima and effectively equilibrates across them, forgetting its initial condition. One can show
that fixation will then eventually occur as if the system only had a single potential minimum
at the lower of the two local potential minima, and will accordingly take place at the boundary
with the lower value of V .
Finally there is the case where ∆0 and ∆1 have opposite signs, e.g. ∆1 > 0, ∆0 < 0 as shown in
Fig. S4(c,d). If the system starts out of x < xs, we have the same case as (a) above: deterministic
relaxation to x?1 followed by fixation at x = 0 on a timescale set by the barrier B0. Otherwise,
the system will initially relax to x?2 and then traverse the maximum at xs: ∆1 > 0 ensures that
activation to the maximum is exponentially faster than fixation at x = 1. After arrival at x?1
the earlier sequence of processes is followed. Because fixation in both cases takes place at x = 0,
the fixation probability is independent of the initial condition.
Whether the fixation time has such a dependence, on the other hand, depends on timescales.
As Fig. S4(c,d) shows, the timescale for activation from x?2 to xs is set by the barrier B1 −∆1,
while the timescale for fixation at x = 0 from x?1 is set by B0. If the former is smaller than the
latter, as in Fig. S4(c), then even when the system initially relaxes to x?2, the timescale for the
overall fixation trajectory will be given by B0: it is therefore independent of the initial condition.
In the converse case of Fig. S4(d), the system will take longer to reach fixation starting from
x > xs because activation from x
?
2 to xs is much slower than fixation from x
?
1. A typical fixation
trajectory here will see the system spend almost all of its time near x?2, before a fluctuation
drives it across xs to x
?
1 and from there to x = 0.
D Fixation in regions of small flow
Here, we explain briefly why the noise-driven escape from the low-flow region around an unstable
fixed fixed point takes a time scaling as ln(N).
Consider the linearized dynamics of a coordination (or other) game near an unstable fixed point.
x(i)
(ii)
(iv)
v
w (iii) Single well potential 
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Figure S5. Phase diagram in the (v, w)-plane, indicating where the different shapes of V (x) occur that are
explained in Fig. S4. The dotted arrow shows how the phase diagram is traversed at fixed v˜ and w˜ when λ is
increased.
After the mapping to Langevin dynamics with additive noise, cf. (35), this can be written in the
form
y˙ = µ˜(y − y0) + 1√
N
ξ(t) (43)
with µ˜ > 0. Assuming that y(0) = y0, a straightforward calculation then shows that the variance
of y(t) is:
〈[y(t)− y0]2〉 = exp(2µ˜t)− 1
2µ˜N
(44)
To have ‘escape’ from the unstable fixed point this needs to be of order unity; call this value c.
Neglecting the −1 in the numerator then gives an escape time of order t = ln(2cµ˜Nc+ 1)/(2µ˜)
which for large N becomes ln(N)/(2µ˜), establishing the promised logarithmic scaling with N .
Note that while we have estimated the time for an escape to a distance of order unity in y-space,
this is equivalent to an order unity distance in x-space as the mapping from x to y is smooth.
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